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  Established in 1991, the Babcock Institute for International Dairy Research and 
Development conducts studies on international dairy marketing and trade and dairy 
science issues that have international dimensions. The Institute's international dairy 
marketing and trade work--the focus of this paper--has produced case studies of dairy 
exporting firms and/or industry studies for New Zealand, Australia, the U.S., Canada, 
Mexico, Argentina, Ireland, Denmark, The Netherlands, Russia, and Kazakhstan.  The 
Institute also has contributed financially to development of a world dairy trade model.  A 
few noteworthy dairy trade policy and management lessons for dairy exporters and 
investors in foreign dairy-food businesses are discussed in this paper.  These lessons 
emerged from studies carried out by Babcock Institute analysts during 1991-2000. 
 
Dairy Trade Policy Lessons 
 
The World Dairy Model   
 
The Cox-Zhu World Dairy Model has generated results that provide a useful 
backdrop for a discussion of dairy trade policy lessons [9,45].  The Cox-Zhu model, a 
mathematical programming model that reflects four years of modeling work, includes the 
following characteristics: 
•  Major Regions:    Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet  
                                   Union, North America, South America, and Oceania. 
•  Major Exporters: Western Europe, Oceania, Eastern Europe and Former  
           Soviet Union, North America, and South America. 
•  Major Importers:  Western Europe, Japan, East Asia, Mid-East/North Africa, 
Central/South America, North America, and Mexico. 
•  Major Products:    Whole Milk Powder, Skim Milk Powder, Butter, Cheese,  
Casein, Whey Proteins, Evaporated/Condensed Milk, Soft 
Products, and Fluid milk.  
The model uses FAO production and trade figures for 1989-94 as base period data. Tariff 
and non-tariff barriers and constraints agreed to under the Uruguay Round GATT 
negotiations are included in the model.  While the model fails to take account of certain 
market imperfections--especially the influence of large traders and investors, it reflects 
many of the underlying economic forces operating in world dairy markets.  
   Results for three scenarios (GATT/WTO 2000, GATT/WTO 2005, and Free 
Trade) are summarized here.  Scenario GATT/WTO 2000 analyzes the impact of the 
Uruguay Round GATT/WTO agreement and assesses how well the model projects 
beyond the data used to construct it.  GATT/WTO 2005 extrapolates from 2000 to 2005 
certain provisions of the agreements on dairy (minimum access, tariff changes, and 
reductions in export subsidies) made under the GATT/WTO Uruguay Round. The Free 
Trade scenario depicts what world dairy markets might be like in the absence of tariff and 
nontariff barriers to dairy trade.  
  Results for GATT/WTO 2000.  The big gainers under this scenario were milk 
producers in Australia, New Zealand, and the Southern Cone of South America and 
consumers in regions where prices fell.  There was little or no impact on the U.S. dairy   3 
industry under the scenario.  Cox characterizes the result for the U.S. as "We (the U.S.) 
got as much as we gave up [9]." There were modest effects on the other protected regions 
(The EU, Canada, and Japan).     
  Results for GATT/WTO 2005.  Cox characterizes the of GATT/WTO 2005 
scenario as one which produces sizeable losses for milk producers in Western Europe, 
modest changes in Japan, Canada, and the U.S., and gains for low cost exporters.  While 
major market distortions remain after GATT/WTO 2005, the model indicates that the 
world would move about half way to "Free Trade" by 2005.  In Western Europe over 
quota tariff levels under this scenario substantially limit access to imported whole milk 
powder but not skim milk powder and butter imports.  Farm milk prices fall 13% to 14% 
in Western Europe, increase by 8% to 9% in Oceania, and change relatively little in the 
U.S. under this scenario.  
  Free Trade.  As expected, results under this scenario are more dramatic.  Milk 
and dairy product production expand in the low-cost producing areas.  Dairy exports 
originating in these same areas increase and decline in high cost countries.  The 
percentage changes in farm milk prices from base period figures under the Free Trade 
scenario are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Percentage Change in Farm Milk Prices from Base Period Levels Under Free  
              Trade Scenario.* 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  Region or Country        % Change in Farm Milk Prices 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Western Europe              -26% 
Japan                      -36%  
Canada                           -32% 
U.S.               No Change 
Mexico                 -17% 
Australia                                    +23% 
New Zealand                +51% 
Argentina                            +17% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*Source: Cox [9]. 
 
The results under the three scenarios correspond broadly to industry expectations. 
Even the results for the Free Trade scenario confirm what dairy exporters have 
understood in a general way for a generation.  For example, several dairy exporters have 
expressed the view that U.S. farm milk prices would not change much under free 
markets.  W.S.J.M. Buck, an officer of Friesland-Coberco Dairy Foods in the 
Netherlands, differed modestly with the results under GATT/WTO 2005 [16, p. 16]. 
Buck figures that both whole milk powder and butter prices in the EU would experience 
downward pressure from imports under over quota tariffs akin to those that would exist 
under the GATT/WTO 2005 scenario.  
  Implications of the Scenarios. While the results are perhaps not surprising, they 
do have important implications. The prospect of little gain for U.S. dairy farmers from   4 
freer trade or free trade in dairy products partially explains the lack of interest on the part 
of most U.S. dairy cooperatives in dairy trade liberalization.  Given the price reductions 
in store for EU milk producers under scenarios similar to GATT/WTO 2005 and Free 
Trade, it is even less surprising that many EU dairy farmers show little eagerness for 
additional dairy trade liberalization.       
  There are of course other reasons for the EU's reluctance to enter negotiations for 
further dairy trade liberalization.  These relate to a possible build up of EU dairy 
surpluses and EU accession.  Under provisions agreed to in the 1999 Berlin Summit, the 
EU will increase milk quotas by about 1.4 million tons in five member states during the 
early 2000's without a matching price cut.  This quota increase will coincide with the 
final stages of the Uruguay Round GATT/WTO agreement during which restrictions on 
dairy export subsidies become increasingly binding because there can be no carry over of 
unused quantities of export subsidy from previous years. The prospect of enlargement of 
the EU to include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, and possibly 
Slovakia could add another 1.6 million tons to the EU's market surplus, according to an 
EU dairy industry source.  This in turn could lead to major increases in EU stockpiles of 
butter and skim milk powder by 2004/05 [1].   
Such comments assume that CAP policies would apply in the expanded territory 
much as in the EU-15.  This is far from assured.  For example, it is unclear how milk 
quotas would be allocated to Poland and other Eastern European countries.  Poland would 
be a problem because milk quotas would be difficult to administer effectively for that 
country's estimated two million mostly small dairy farmers.  
  Actions taken in the Berlin Summit of 1999 to effectively extend EU milk 
production quotas until 2008, delay price reductions until 2005-2006, and delay the "mid-
term" review of the milk quota system until 2005 are regarded by many as actions that 
will have to be revisited within a relatively few years [16, p. 15].  There is speculation 
that the EU will conduct a mid-term review of the milk quota and milk pricing system  
beginning as early as 2002.  Among the options available to the EU for dealing with 
domestic dairy policy reform and accession issues relating to dairy are the following: 
•  Fine tune existing CAP dairy policies--reduce dairy support prices by small 
amounts, use nontariff barriers to limit dairy imports, expand subsidized dairy 
exports by finessing GATT/WTO limits on dairy export subsidies, and delay 
EU enlargement.   
•  Discontinue milk quotas, lower milk price supports, and compensate present 
EU dairy farmers for losses in income associated with eastward expansion of 
the EU under a non-quota and lower dairy price support regime.  This 
compensation would be made under the assumption that eastward expansion 
of the EU would occur during the mid-2000s. Concurrently, relax the budget 
constraints on CAP spending to permit the compensation called for under this 
option.  
•  Expand the EU but delay giving Eastern European farmers full access to 
payments under the CAP.  This option would allow milk quotas to remain in 
the EU-15 but not be extended to Eastern European countries added to the EU. 
Pursuing any of the options would be complex and time consuming. The bottom 
line is that the EU is not likely to be willing to consider any substantial dairy tariff 
reductions, increases in dairy market access, and reductions in dairy export subsidies until   5 
it has decided how to revise its domestic dairy policies and accommodate the entry of the 
Eastern European countries into the EU.   
  Thus it is no surprise that EU dairy organizations have implicitly and, in one case 
explicitly, invited the U.S. to join the EU in doing nothing to change dairy trade policies 
in the current WTO negotiations [16].  While the U.S. will decline the invitations and, at 
a minimum, seek additional reductions in dairy export subsidies in the WTO negotiations, 
there is little indication that this initiative will be successful. The EU is simply not in 
position to make more than minor dairy trade concessions in negotiations given its 
current domestic dairy policies and the upcoming EU expansion. 
  U.S. dairy policy makers don't face dairy policy problems as complex as those 
facing the EU.  However, depressed U.S. farm milk prices caused the U.S. Congress and 
Administration to delay ending the USDA's dairy price support program, which was 
scheduled to expire on December 31, 1999.  That program is now likely to continue at 
least through 2002. The low U.S. farm milk prices of late 1999 and 2000 make 
consideration of additional access to U.S. dairy market access a tough sell for proponents 
of dairy trade liberalization. The U.S. is exceedingly unlikely to open the country's dairy 
markets to more imports in the absence of similar actions from the EU and other 
restricted markets. 
   There is a lesson here.  It is likely that significant additional access to the EU and 
U.S. dairy markets, if obtained at all, will be preceded by compensation for dairy farmers 
in these two large blocks.  Proposals for deregulation and additional market access simply 
are likely to be nonstarters without producer compensation. More analysis is needed on 
how such compensation might be provided most effectively.  
 
Deregulation and Compensation: The Australian Dairy Industry Model 
 
   Australia's dairy deregulation initiatives of 2000--which include compensation for 
milk producers--provide a noteworthy model [13].  Australia's dairy industry became 
arguably the most deregulated in the world effective July 1, 2000.  In the 1990s, 
Australia's state fluid milk pricing programs generated farm milk prices for fluid milk  
that were about twice as high as those for manufacturing milk. Fluid milk quotas 
undergirded the fluid milk pricing systems in New South Wales, Queensland, and 
Western Australia.   Under Australia's Domestic Market Support Scheme, levies on fluid 
milk producers and on processors for manufactured milk products sold domestically were 
collected and distributed to manufacturing milk producers.  
Victoria's powerful dairy groups--which produce mostly manufacturing milk and 
which account for nearly two-thirds of all milk produced in Australia--proposed to end 
government regulation of milk prices in part because: 
•  Dairy export markets were regarded as the growth markets and Victoria's 
dairy groups thought they could be more competitive in export markets if 
domestic price supports were ended, and  
•  State milk control practices had prevented or discouraged Victoria's dairy 
industry from selling fluid milk in other states.  
Milk producers in Australia's fluid milk states (Queensland, New South Wales, 
South Australia, and Western Australia) were powerless to resist deregulation, mainly 
because Victoria's producer organizations presented them with an offer that was difficult   6 
to refuse: Either accept deregulation of state milk pricing with compensation or get 
deregulation without compensation.   
    Australia's Dairy Farmer Compensation Package. The compensation package 
made available to Australia's milk producers to help them adjust to a deregulated 
environment included the following features [13]: 
•  Restructuring payments will be made to eligible dairy farmers in the amounts 
of AU 46.23 cents/liter (U.S.$ 11.70/cwt) for fluid milk and AU 8.96 
cents/liter (U.S.$ 2.27/cwt) for manufacturing milk produced in the 1998/99 
base year.  The average milk producer in the relatively high fluid utilization 
state of Queensland will receive about AU$110,000 (U.S.$63,250) to help 
him/her adjust to a deregulated industry.  
•  The AU$ 1.74 billion (U.S.$ 1.0 billion) required to finance the restructuring 
package will be provided by an AU 11 cent/liter (U.S. 6.3 cents/liter) 
government levy on all fluid milk products sold in Australia's domestic 
market.  
•  Restructuring payments will be made quarterly for eight years, beginning July 
1, 2000. 
•  The Australian Dairy Industry Council negotiated with banks to establish an 
industry facility that will permit an individual farmer to obtain the discounted 
present value of his/her quarterly payments as an upfront payment regardless 
of whether the farmer plans to stay or leave the industry.   
Impacts of Dairy Industry Deregulation and Compensation In Australia.  Prior to  
deregulation, architects of the restructuring package developed an estimate of the size of 
the consumer transfers under state milk pricing that was used for figuring the size of the 
restructuring payment to market milk producers.  The consumer transfer (value of the 
ability to trade in the market) was estimated to be about AU 15 cents per liter for fluid 
milk. Thus, the compensation package will pay Australian fluid milk producers the 
equivalent of three plus years of fluid premium.  Government officials and dairy farmers 
hope that this package will help finance the exit of some farmers from the industry and 
restructure the industry to be more competitive in international markets.     
As a result of deregulation, milk production almost certainly will become 
concentrated on larger farms in low cost production areas within Australia.  The number 
of dairy farms in fluid milk states is expected to decline by 25% to 30% after 
deregulation.  The combined effect of the increased size of farmers remaining in business 
and exit of smaller farmers is expected to cause the country's milk production to decline 
for a few years and then resume the upward trajectory of the 1990s.  
  Close parallels to the situation that forced deregulation of Australia's dairy 
industry do not presently exist in the EU, U.S., or Canada.  In particular, there are no 
producer organizations in the latter countries with market and political clout comparable 
to that wielded by Australia's Victoria groups.   Thus, the governments and dairy 
industries of these countries will not be under strong pressures to deregulate their dairy 
industries in the immediate future.  
  What is the lesson for regulated-protectionist dairy industries?  Immediate gains 
for U.S., EU, and Canadian milk producer organizations from maintaining high border 
protection and pricing regulations will come at a cost. Australian dairy exporters--
probably linked still more closely with New Zealand firms--will gain additional early   7 
mover advantages in Asian growth markets for dairy products, making it more costly for 
North American and EU exporters to expand sales there.  In the U.S. and EU, growth-
oriented dairy firms will take market share from weaker firms in the domestic market 
rather than seek export markets.  For example, lacking export markets three California 
firms that plan to expand that state's cheese processing capacity by 40% within five years 
will turn inward and compete for market share against firms in the Upper Midwestern 
U.S. 
   
The WTO's Decision on Canada's Dairy Export Subsidy Programs 
 
  The 1999 WTO panel decisions on Canada's Class 5 pricing system has sweeping 
implications for dairy trade policy [11].  In particular, the decision helps to clarify what 
constitutes a dairy export subsidy under Article 9.1 of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture.  It also may short-circuit any U.S. plans for adopting a Class IV dairy 
exporting arrangement and proposals for two-tier dairy export subsidy programs 
advocated by a Danish dairy organization.       
  Objections to Canada's Class 5 Pricing System.  Canada's transition to end use 
pricing and pooling in August 1995 produced a system that had characteristics and 
impacts similar to producer levies that were subject to explicit subsidy reduction 
commitments under Article 9.1 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.  When Canada 
chose not to count dairy exports made with the benefit of its end use pricing and pooling 
arrangement against WTO constraints on subsidized dairy exports, the country invited a 
challenge under the WTO by the U.S. and New Zealand.   
  The U.S. and New Zealand were primarily concerned with the impacts of 
Canada's Class 5(d) and 5(e) prices.  Canada's Class 5(d) system prices specific 
negotiated exports including cheese under quota destined for the U.S. and UK markets, 
evaporated milk, whole milk powder and niche market exports.  The Class 5(e) provision 
prices milk entering products used for surplus removal. 
  The WTO panels found that Canada's dairy export sales made under Class 5(d) 
and 5(e) were subsidized exports within the meaning of Article 9.1 of the WTO's 
Agreement on Agriculture.  The WTO concluded that the lower prices afforded exporters 
for Class 5(d) and 5(e) milk constituted payments in kind financed by virtue of 
government action and accordingly should be considered export subsidies.  Canada 
argued that government intervention in the country's pricing and pooling system did not 
approach the level required under Article 9.1(a) of the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture.  
The WTO panels rejected this argument.      
  Implications.  Absent a WTO challenge, Canada's Class 5 pricing system would 
have allowed that country to make essentially unlimited exports of subsidized dairy 
products.  The system would have invited imitation by other countries and reduced the  
effectiveness of limits on dairy export subsidies agreed to under the Uruguay Round 
GATT/WTO agreement. 
  If the Class 5 pricing system had survived the WTO challenge, the system would 
have been particularly beneficial to Canada as a "small country" exporter.  Under the 
scheme, Canada could make essentially unlimited subsidized exports without sharply 
depressing world dairy product prices.  If the U.S. or EU used a similar scheme, this   8 
would depress prices in thin international dairy markets and eliminate a portion of the 
benefits for U.S. and EU farmers.   
  It apparently will not be feasible for the U.S. to employ a Class IV export class 
under which proceeds from dairy export sales at world prices would be priced and pooled 
under federal milk orders.  (A Class IV system was considered for inclusion in the 1996 
U.S. farm bill but did not become part of that legislation.)  The Class IV pricing and 
pooling arrangement for dairy export sales would be similar to the one described as an 
export subsidy in the WTO decisions on Canada's Class 5 pricing system.  
  The U.S.'s National Milk Producers Federation has suggested that a producer-
financed program could be used to subsidize the export of part of the country's structural 
surplus of nonfat dry milk.  The Federation had in mind using producer financing to 
subsidize the exports of surplus U.S. nonfat dry milk that cannot be exported under the 
USDA's Dairy Export Incentive Program and that the USDA does not purchase for food 
assistance programs.  Arguably a program could be constructed that would be WTO-
compatible if the government was not involved in operating the program and 
participation by producers was voluntary, conditions that would be difficult to achieve.  
At a minimum, such a program might attract a WTO challenge. 
  Proposals to employ a two-tier dairy export subsidy program--of the type 
advocated by the Danish Dairy Board in particular--will be discouraged by the WTO 
panel decisions regarding Canada's program.  Although the two-tier arrangement would 
not necessarily involve pooling of surplus EU milk sold at world prices, such sales could 
still be considered an export subsidy--at least that is what the WTO's decision with 
respect to Canada's Class 5 pricing system suggests.     
  In addition to lessons noted above, the episode reminds us to expect delays in 
achieving mutually acceptable resolutions to WTO challenges. While the WTO has 
spoken regarding Canada's Class 5 pricing arrangement, it is not clear that Canada will 
respond in ways that satisfy the U.S. and New Zealand.  Canada, the U.S., and New 
Zealand agreed in 1999 to a December 31, 2000 deadline (later extended to January 31, 
2001) for Canada to comply with the WTO ruling. The plans put forth by Canada 
apparently would leave Class 5(d) and Class 5(e) pricing systems intact but would 
transfer system operations to the provinces.  Canada argues that the changes exclude 
governments and marketing boards from export transactions.  The U.S. has complained 
that Ottawa is preparing a new system of identical provincial payments which merely 
disguises the old.  When the dispute will be fully resolved is unclear.  
 
Reduced Roles for State Trading Enterprises 
 
  With the notable exception of the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB), export 
marketing boards and other state trading enterprises (STE) are playing a smaller role in 
the world dairy industry.  Evidence of the reduced roles of dairy STE's includes the 
following:  
•  When Ireland considered joining the then European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1971, the monopoly nature of Ireland's Dairy Board (IDB) was 
thought to be legally indefensible and commercially constricting. 
Accordingly, Ireland gave up the IDB's monopoly exporting privileges when 
it entered the EEC in 1973.  Given freedom to do so, two large Irish dairy   9 
firms--the Kerry Group and Avonmore Foods (now part of Glanbia) chose to 
export dairy products for their own account beginning in the early 1990s.   
•  Denmark's Dairy Board had exporting functions in its earlier years but 
relinquished the exporting role when MD Foods (now part of Arla Foods 
amba) and other Danish firms grew in size and developed strong exporting 
capabilities.  
•  The commercial exporting roles of Ausdairy and the Australian Dairy 
Corporation (ADC) have become relatively small.   Ausdairy is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the ADC which is an STE.  Ausdairy focuses on market 
development and trading on behalf of Australian companies.  Sales of the 
Australian Dairy Corporation totaled AU$ 299 million (U.S.$ 206 million) in 
1998, a small figure compared to export sales of big international competitors 
such as the New Zealand Dairy Board (sales of approximately U.S$ 3.3 
billion in 1998-99).  Murray Goulburn Cooperative and Bonlac Foods (now 
owned partly by the New Zealand Dairy Board) have emerged as major dairy 
exporters, reducing the need for an STE exporter.   
•  CONASUPO for decades prior to 1999 was Mexico's exclusive importer of 
milk powders and other food staples for distribution under social programs 
and to the private sector.  This STE now has a much smaller role.  Beginning 
in 1999, the Mexican government slashed the agency's budget and eliminated 
many of its functions [39, p. 4]. The Mexican agency LICONSA will now 
directly import milk powder to produce reconstituted milk for low income 
people in Mexico.  Milk powder imports for the private sector will be handled 
by Mexico's Departments of Commerce and Agriculture.  Among other 
things, the diminished role for CONASUPO reflects the desire of Mexico's 
government and others to remove a bureaucratic layer from milk powder 
importing.   
The NZDB has felt some of the same pressures that led to reduced roles for dairy  
STE's in other countries. Indeed, up until early 2000 the organization was scheduled to 
lose its monopoly exporting privilege and perhaps be merged into a mega cooperative 
(dubbed "MergeCo") in New Zealand.  The mega cooperative would have combined the 
NZDB, New Zealand Dairy Group, Kiwi Cooperative, and smaller New Zealand dairy 
cooperatives into one organization that would have been the world's 12
th largest dairy 
marketing organization [1]. That particular New Zealand mega cooperative failed to 
materialize. However, the boards of directors of the New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi 
Cooperative did agree to merge those two organizations in December 2000.  If approved 
by 75% of the members of the two cooperatives, the merger will create an organization  
called the Global Dairy Company.   
  There are plans to combine the NZDB with the Global Dairy Company and  
eliminate the Board's monopoly exporting privilege. However, these changes will require 
approval of New Zealand's Commerce Commission and New Zealand's Parliament.  It is 
unclear whether and when these approvals will be forthcoming.  Therefore, for the 
present, the Board's status remains basically unchanged from earlier years.   
Arguably, the Board's successes and the quality of its management account for the 
firm's ability to retain its current structure longer that other STE's.  These Board attributes  
have manifested themselves in prominent ways.  The NZDB was named New Zealand's   10 
Exporter of the Year in 1999.   From time to time, the CEO's of the NZDB have been  
listed in business publications ranking New Zealand's top business executives.  The 
NZDB also has garnered about a 31% market share in international dairy markets, up 
from 19% in 1990 [15, 31].  These are important points. But as noted later, former NZDB 
Chairman, Graham Fraser, has characterized the New Zealand dairy industry's current 
structure--including the NZDB--as commercially constricting.  This concern is likely to 
produce sweeping changes in the Board.  The lesson for competitors is to expect dairy 
exporting practices and dairy-food investment practices of the New Zealanders to change 
significantly in the not-too-distant future.          
 
Management Lessons for Dairy Exporters 
 
  This section focuses on management lessons for dairy exporters and firms 
involved in foreign direct investment in dairy businesses.  The lessons emerge primarily 
from Babcock Institute case studies of Nestle, the NZDB, the Kerry Group of Ireland, 
and Food Master of Central Asia.  The Institute's case studies for Dean Foods (U.S.A.), 
M.E. Franks (Belgium and U.S.A), the Irish Dairy Board, Danish Dairy Board, Campina 
Melkunie (Netherlands), Friesland Coberco (Netherlands) and MD Foods (now part of 
Arla Foods amba) revealed that these firms also have performed effectively as dairy 
exporters or as foreign direct investors in dairy businesses.  However, Nestle, the NZDB, 
Kerry, and Food Master were selected for emphasis because they represent a cross 
section of businesses that yield a range of potentially useful management lessons.     
  Nestle and the NZDB were easy choices to emphasize in the paper partly because 
these firms were mentioned frequently when the following question was put to officers of 
case firms studied: Who are your most important competitors?  The answer invariably 
was, "It depends on which products you are talking about".  Nestle was frequently 
mentioned when the competition related to highly differentiated dairy products.  The 
NZDB was often mentioned when the competition was broader, encompassing 
differentiated or partially differentiated products and bulk dairy products.   
  Before discussing strategies of Nestle and the NZDB, it is useful to give examples 
of highly differentiated, partially differentiated, and bulk dairy products: 
•  Highly differentiated (often branded) products: Specialty cheeses, premium 
yogurt, premium ice cream, and fluid items. 
•  Partially differentiated products: Milkfat fractions, whey fractions and other 
dried whey products, cheese powders, and a host of dairy products used as 
food ingredients. 





  The company traces its origins to the Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Company 
founded in 1866 in Cham, Switzerland.  Anglo-Swiss merged with Farine Lactee Henri 
Nestle--a producer of infant formula --in 1905 to create the foundation for the modern 
company.  Over the years, the company has developed or acquired such well known  
brands as Carnation, Klim, Nescafe, Libby's, Stouffer's, Kitkat and Perrier [12,26].    11 
However, these brands understate Nestle's brand presence worldwide.  The company has 
about 8,000 brands, nearly a tenth of which are registered in more than one country.  In 
1999, the company had about 230,000 employees, 495 factories in 77 countries, and sales 
of about U.S.$ 45 billion [3, 19, and 33, p. 73].  
  Nestle's products and sales by geographic areas for 1999 in millions of Swiss 
francs are shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2.  Nestle's Products and Sales by Region in Swiss Francs, 1999.* 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Products    Sales        % of            Regions           Sales           % of  
            Total                     Total 
________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                          
Beverages    20,859       27.9%  Europe   27,098           36.3% 
 
Milk, Nutrition, 
and Ice Cream   19,411       26.0  Americas         22,045           29.5 
 
Prepared Dishes &                                          Africa, Asia 
Cooking Aids    20,185       27.0  & Oceania       13,611           18.2  
             
Chocolate &                                                    Other 
Confections    10,195       13.7  activities          11,906           16.0  
 
Pharmaceuticals           4,010          5.4 
  Totals             74,660     100.0%                          74,660          100.0% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*Source: Nestle Financial Information [26]. 
 
  Nestle in 1998 was the world's largest seller of powdered/condensed milk, non-
dairy creamers, soluble coffee, mineral water, and chocolate and confectionery products 
[33, p. 73].   Nestle has emerged as the world's No. 2 seller of ice cream, behind 
Unilever.   
  Nestle's Strategies.  Nestle's strategies, which are associated mainly with foreign 
direct investment in dairy and other food businesses, include the following: 
•  Balance sales between low risk and low growth countries of the developed 
world and high risk and potentially high growth markets of Africa and Latin 
America [38]. 
•  Keep brands local and people regional; only technology goes global [34]. 
•  In developed markets, grow and gain economies of scale through foreign 
direct investment in big companies such as Carnation, Perrier, and Stouffer.  
In the developing world, grow by manipulating ingredients or processing 
technology for local conditions, and employ the appropriate (often local) 
brands [34]. 
•  In developing countries, first establish sales channels by making basic, mass-
produced foodstuffs that the locals can afford.  Then as consumers in these   12 
countries grow richer, pump higher-valued products through these same 
channels [17]. 
•  Deepen the pool of Asian managers to gain a cadre of autonomous regional 
managers who know more about the culture of the local markets than 
Americans or Europeans [34]. 
•  Employ a wide-area strategy for Asia which involves producing different 
products in each country to supply the region with a given product from one 
country [32].  
•  Strike strategic partnerships when this produces advantages for the firm.  
•  Engage in nearly constant restructuring and cost-cutting.   
•  Initiate or join business-to-business (B2B) internet-based systems that offer 
the firm and competitors in Europe and the U.S. an opportunity to drive down 
costs by pooling their purchases from commonly used suppliers and by 
automating certain accounting functions [19].   
Nestle derives its prowess from practices in addition to those pertaining to  
strategies.  The author observed Nestle's practices in Mexico during the 1990s.  In 
Mexico, the company exercised both good business practices and was politically well 
connected.  The political connections, it appears, gave Nestle significant influence on 
Mexico's dairy policies at least during the early to mid-1990s.  
  Effectiveness of Nestle's Strategies.  The effectiveness of Nestle's strategies can be 
gauged in part from comments of the firm's competitors, suppliers, and others.  
Dairy exporters and firms engaged in foreign direct investment in dairy 
businesses generally had a high regard for Nestle's prowess as a competitor.  Several 
firms interviewed served both as a supplier of bulk dairy products to Nestle and as a 
competitor of Nestle in differentiated dairy product markets.  Nestle was typically 
characterized as a fair but demanding customer for bulk dairy products and a formidable 
competitor in differentiated dairy product markets. 
  The company has been described as a first class innovator in the U.S. market [10].  
Examples of recent innovations include Carnation Coffee-Mate liquid fat free creamer, 
Butterfinger chocolate/peanut butter 2% milk, and ready-to-drink Carnation Instant 
Breakfast.  These products have been achieved partly through large R&D expenditures.  
  Nestle has been described as having a "formidable world-wide distribution 
system" which the company can use to market Haagen-Dazs ice cream, a product that the 
firm acquired the distribution rights for through a 1999 joint venture with Diageo PLC 
[5].  However, there apparently are weaknesses in Nestle's ice cream business.  A Credit 
Lyonnais report said that Nestle's ice cream unit "lags behind Unilever's dominant global 
position and doesn't generate profit"[3].  A Dean Foods official described Nestle's 
business in Mexico as strong in reconstituted milk sales but weak in ice cream sales.        
  The company's strong cash flow and "comfortable" debt-equity ratio have given it 
ample muscle for takeovers.  However, it also has earned kudos for avoiding the need to   
make acquisitions to pump up earnings [3].  Nestle's earnings in 1999, for example, 
exceeded those of Unilever and certain U.S. food manufacturers.  Thus Nestle was in a 
position to pass on the opportunity to acquire Nabisco Holdings Corporation (maker of 
Oreo cookies, Ritz Crackers, and Planters nuts) in 2000 when Nabisco was placed on the 
market.  One reason for Nestle's lack of interest was that Nestle's product lines and those 
of Nabisco wouldn't easily mix.  Nestle didn't consider Nabisco Holdings products to be   13 
essential to its core businesses such as milk, ice cream, bottled water, confectioneries, 
and pet food.   
  What management lessons can dairy exporters and firms investing in foreign 
dairy-food businesses take from Nestle?  Nestle regards Asia, Latin America, and 
possibly Africa as growth markets for dairy products.  Especially now that Asian 
economies are recovering, it may be profitable for U.S. and European firms to expand 
sales in these markets rather than fight over market share in the U.S. and European 
markets which Nestle has characterized as being "flat and fiercely competitive" [36].  A 
number of other strategies may have appeal, such as balancing sales between low risk and  
low growth markets of the developed world and high risk but potentially high growth 
markets of the developing world.  
  While there are undoubtedly useful lessons in Nestle's strategies that might be 
emulated by other dairy exporters or those engaged in foreign direct investment in dairy 
businesses, there is also an ominous factor for suppliers.  Nestle's decision to enter into 
B2B initiatives will doubtless squeeze profits of suppliers of bulk products to the firm.    
 
The New Zealand Dairy Board 
 
  The NZDB is an organization in transition.  As noted earlier, the Board appears 
scheduled to become part of a combined organization (the Global Dairy Company) that 
includes the current New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Cooperative--two cooperatives 
that process more than two-thirds of the milk marketed in New Zealand. The Board also 
is scheduled to lose its statutory monopoly exporting privilege when it becomes part of 
the larger organization.  However, it is not clear when and whether the regulatory and 
parliamentary approvals required to combine the NZDB with the Global Dairy Company 
will be obtained.    
  Thus, the NZDB is for the present left substantially unchanged. In its present 
form, the NZDB is the world's largest specialized, private dairy exporting firm. During 
the June 30, 1998 to May 31, 1999 fiscal year, the NZDB had sales of NZ$ 7.4 billion 
(approximately US$ 3.3 billion).  It employed 9,800 staff in New Zealand and 98 
subsidiary and 19 associate companies worldwide [30].  The firm exports dairy products 
to over 120 countries and territories worldwide. 
  The major market destinations for the NZDB's dairy exports and the value of 
those exports during 1998-99 appear in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Market Destination and Value of  NZDB Dairy Exports, 1998-99.* 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  Market           Value (NZ$)                    % of Sales 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Europe/Africa          NZ$ 1,514 million         20.4% 
  South East Asia        NZ$ 1,572 million             21.2 
  Middle East           NZ$    308 million               4.1 
  Latin America          NZ$ 1,697 million             22.9 
  North Asia          NZ$    672 million               9.0 
  New Zealand/Australia/Pacific    NZ$    517 million               7.0   14 
  CIS            NZ$    171 million               2.3 
  North America        NZ$   970 million              13.1   
        Total      NZ$ 7,421 million           100.0% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*Source: New Zealand Dairy Board, Industry Fact Sheet [30]   
 
  The NZDB had about a 31% market share (milk equivalent basis) of world dairy 
exports in 1999 [31].  This placed the Board second only to the EU which had a 37% 
market share in that year.  Australia was a distant third (13% market share) and the U.S. 
had only about a 4% market share in 1999.  The NZDB has increased its market share 
from about 19% in 1990 to the 31% market share in 1999, mainly at the expense of the 
EU [15,31].  
  Early Core and Subsidiary Strategies of the NZDB.  Sir Dryden Spring, a former 
NZDB Chairman, described the Board's core strategy for the early 1990's as follows in 
1989 [35]: "Lift the 30% to 40% of milk which is sold as value-added (differentiated or 
partially differentiated) products to as close to 100% as we can get as soon as possible". 
Subsidiary strategies included the following [27]: (a) Expand the Board's global own-
brand consumer products business, (b) grow the value-added ingredients business, (c) 
develop further the Board's international food service business, (d) increase dominance of 
the UK consumer butter and cheese markets, and (e) continue to take advantage of 
opportunities created in Europe by the GATT/WTO agreement.  The core and subsidiary 
product differentiation strategies were superimposed onto a strategy of being supplied by 
the world's lowest cost milk producers.   
  New Strategies of the NZDB.  In 2000, the NZDB unveiled an ambitious new 
strategy.  The new strategy is based on work carried out in 1998 and 1999 by New 
Zealand dairy industry representatives working jointly with McKinsey and Company, a  
management consulting firm.  
  The Board reported that it has developed a new 10-year strategy that will create a 
global dairy business four times larger than today's industry.   According to the Board, 
the new strategy will create value for New Zealand's dairy farmers by manufacturing and 
marketing products in the following categories [31]: 
•  Value added dairy products and dairy commodities made from New Zealand 
milk. 
•  Dairy products made with milk from other countries using the industry's  
skills and know-how.  
The strategy targets a 15% minimum return on the total gross assets of the  
businesses, 15% annual growth in revenues, and a 4% annual improvement in 
productivity from farm to customer.  
  What lies behind the decision to change strategies?  NZDB representatives said 
the pressure to change the Board's strategies stemmed from a number of external business 
factors, specifically decreasing long-term commodity prices, increasingly aggressive 
international competitors, globalization of supermarket chains, and very slow trade 
liberalization [31, p. 7].  
  Specifically, the Board noted that competitors--especially those in Australia and 
Argentina--were achieving productivity gains that outstripped or soon would outstrip 
those of New Zealand. The key to defending New Zealand's position, the Board claimed,   15 
was to bring about aggressive productivity gains, attaining 4% per year productivity 
improvements across the value chain from farmer to consumer.  According to the Board, 
the following steps would be required to achieve this productivity growth: 
•  Send the correct price signal to farmers about the value of additional milk. 
•  Improve the manufacturing product mix by rapidly sending correct price 
signals back to manufacturers to encourage production shifts to more 
profitable products. 
•  Aggressively improve productivity on the farm, in manufacturing plants, and 
in marketing operations using technologies (e.g., biotechnology) and 
international benchmarking to ensure best practices are adopted on farms and 
in every manufacturing site and marketing office.  
•  Measure productivity improvement across the value chain.  
The NZDB's strategy document contains a strongly worded criticism of New  
Zealand's dairy industry structure and, by implication, of the Board itself, expressed as 
follows [31]: 
 
  "The current industry structure has evolved to manufacture, market and hence add  
value to New Zealand milk.  It is not suited to an aggressive global growth  
strategy.  The structure has become complex and politicized leading to drawn out  
and often inconsistent decision making.  In addition, we are not able to take  
maximum advantage of changes in the way businesses operate using improved  
communication and transaction technologies." 
 
  Former NZDB Chairman, Graham Fraser, elaborated on these comments as 
follows in early 2000 [29]:   
 
  "We have evolved to the position where we need formal integration of  
manufacturing and marketing. Our present structure has become slow and  
unwieldy.  It is not conducive to the type of business we wish to be in." 
 
  The Board reports that there are three elements to the firm's growth strategy, 
namely, to  (a) pursue an Industry Milks strategy, (b) develop global ingredients 
businesses to dominate niche markets, and (c) optimize the ingredients network by selling 
both New Zealand and non-New Zealand dairy products.  The Industry Milks element of 
the growth strategy is new and represents a noteworthy departure from earlier strategies. 
Fraser explained the rationale for pursuing an Industry Milks strategy as follows [29]: 
 
  "Fast moving consumer companies in the dairy trade supply a range of goods-- 
from the shelf stable products such as ours to the fresh range.  Products such as 
yogurt, pasteurized fresh milk, UHT, fresh cheese, dairy desserts, etc.  Our  
competitors have this full range.  If we are serious, and we are, then we must  
emulate them.  To be successful in the global consumer business we are going to  
have to view it as more than simply an outlet for your milk….This means using  
local milk where shelf life restrictions rule out NZ product.  It also means being  
prepared to do business in countries to which we are unable to take our product  
because of tariff barriers."    16 
 
  Among the structural options commented on favorably by New Zealand dairy 
industry officials was one which would (a) create one company for the collection, 
manufacturing, and sale of commodities and ingredients, and (b) establish a separate 
consumer company.  "The consumer company was to be initially fully owned by (an 
organization similar to the Global Dairy Company) but structured in such a way that, if 
required, it could attract external equity in the future" [31, p. 16](emphasis supplied). 
The rub will be for the NZDB (and the Global Dairy Company) to figure out how 
it can structure a consumer company that would attract outside equity.  New Zealand 
farmers have been skittish about possibly losing control of the Board.  Plans to bring in 
outside equity capital will elevate this concern.    
  How feasible are the strategies?   The Board has marketing infrastructure in place 
in other countries that could employ milk produced in these other countries for 
manufacturing products that would carry NZDB brands. This presumably will help New 
Zealand's dairy industry to expand its network of alliances and joint ventures involving 
foreign dairy cooperatives and propriety firms. The firm's foreign subsidiaries also will 
provide a vehicle for purchasing foreign firms, as a recent example illustrates.  The 
Board's Milk Products Holding (Latin America, Ltd.) subsidiary signed an agreement in 
mid-2000 with the owner of S.A.Fabrica de Produtos Alimenticios Vigor of Brazil to 
purchase 51% of that company [28]. The Brazilian firm has a strong base in Sao Paulo, 
Brazil a city of 20 million people.  The Brazilian company's product line includes fluid 
milk, cheese, cultured products, butter, margarine and blends.  This acquisition, once it 
clears due diligence, will be consistent with the NZDB's Industry Milks strategy.     
Whether the New Zealand dairy industry can achieve its growth objectives is 
another matter.  As noted later, the Kerry Group of Ireland achieved a 15% average 
annual growth in revenues during 1994 to 1998 [42].  Hence, this growth rate is within 
the realm of the possible for New Zealand's dairy industry.  Increasing the size of New 
Zealand's industry fourfold would create an industry about 60% as large as the U.S. dairy 
industry as measured by milk processed.  This appears to be a stretch. Raising the capital 
required for the industry's consumer company also will be a challenge.  
  Of course many of these strategies may be modified if at a future time officers of 
the Global Dairy Company combined with the NZDB see the challenges facing New 
Zealand's dairy industry differently or choose to address the challenges in fundamentally 
different ways. 
 
The Kerry Group/PLC 
 
  The Kerry Group/PLC of Ireland represents a company that has adjusted well to a 
challenging business environment, profited from acquisitions, and reduced its reliance on 
commodity dairy products [42].  The firm is involved in both dairy-food exporting and 
foreign investment in dairy-food businesses.    
  Headquartered in Tralee, County Kerry Ireland, the Kerry Group/PLC is a 
diversified food ingredients and consumer foods company. The firm grew from a small 
dairy cooperative that had sales of about U.S.$50 million in 1974 to a multinational firm 
with sales of U.S.$2.4 billion in 1999 that has operations in Ireland, the U.S., continental   17 
Europe, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, Australia, and 
Malaysia.  
  Kerry's Core Strategy.  Kerry Group/PLC's core strategy has included 
diversifying and growing the business, emphasizing sales of differentiated (value-added) 
food ingredients and consumer food products.  The firm's strategies have produced a 
strong emphasis on food ingredients as indicated in Kerry's divisional sales figures for 
1998 [42]: 
•  Kerry Ingredients    63% 
•  Kerry Foods    34% 
•  Kerry Agribusiness    3% 
As the firm grew into a world leadership position in food ingredients, the sales of Irish-
based dairy products declined to about 11% of the firm's total revenues. 
  Origins of the Kerry Group/PLC.  Kerry Cooperative Creameries Ltd. (parent of 
the current organization) began its legal existence in January 1974.  In the early 1970s, a 
brucellosis eradication program reduced Kerry Cooperative's milk supply by about 20%.   
Facing this situation, the Kerry Cooperative's management and board of directors 
concluded that if the firm was to grow it needed to reduce the reliance on commodity 
dairy products and diversify into differentiated products.  The management and board 
also recognized that the viable options open to firm were to diversify or merge.  The firm 
opted for diversification.  As part of this initiative, Kerry Cooperative in 1979-80 bought 
19 Irish firms that sold branded food products.   
  Financing Strategies of the Kerry Group/PLC.  The Kerry Group/PLC is 
sometimes held up as a model for emulation because it changed successfully from a 
cooperative into a cooperative/public limited company.  Kerry Cooperative's conversion 
into a cooperative/public limited company took place as follows [42]: 
•  In June 1986, Kerry Cooperative exchanged its assets for majority holding in 
a PLC, mainly to obtain capital for growth. 
•  In October 1986, shares of the Kerry Group/PLC were offered to the public 
and subsequently listed on the Dublin and London stock exchanges. 
•  Kerry Group/PLC's shares traded for about 52 Irish pence (about U.S.$0.70 
per share) when the firm's shares were first issued in 1986. In early to mid-
2000, the shares traded mostly in the U.S.$12.00 to U.S.$14.00 range.   
•  In 1996, Kerry Cooperative reduced its holdings in Kerry Group/PLC below 
the 51% level.  This action allowed the Kerry Group/PLC to float additional 
shares to obtain needed expansion capital and increase the liquidity of trading 
in the firm's shares.  
Kerry Cooperative and Kerry Group/PLC have effectively handled the conflicts 
between farmer and non-farmer shareholders that arise when an agricultural cooperative 
converts to a cooperative/PLC.  Kerry Cooperative's farmer members initially were 
persuaded to accept the conversion partly as a result of effective communication efforts 
by management.  Farmer acceptance became progressively easier for management to 
achieve as farmer-shareholders witnessed the firm's successes and the share appreciation 
that made many of them wealthy.  
Kerry Group/PLC's Acquisitions.  The financing capacity achieved by the firm in 
part by the move to cooperative/PLC status allowed the firm to accelerate overseas 
acquisitions.  Kerry Group/PLC opened its first overseas food ingredients manufacturing   18 
plant in Jackson, Wisconsin in 1987 and in 1988 acquired Beatreme Food Ingredients (a 
division of Beatrice Corporation) for U.S.$ 130 million.  One of the larger acquisitions, 
DCA, was obtained from Allied Domecq for U.S.$402 million in 1994. By 1995, Kerry 
Group/PLC had made about 43 acquisitions, acquisitions that doubled the size of the firm 
in each of the previous five-year periods.  The firm's more recent acquisitions have been 
for food ingredients firms, most of which generated high profit margins.  An example 
was the February 2000 acquisition of the SFI Group--a specialty food ingredients 
company with sales in the U.S. and Europe--for U.S.$ 80 million.  
While Kerry's early acquisitions were made partly with capital raised in the share 
market, the bulk of Kerry Group/PLC's acquisitions--especially those made before Kerry 
Cooperative relinquished majority control in 1996--were made with debt. 
  Strategies and Practices that Undergird the Kerry Group/PLC's Financing, 
Expansion, and Diversification Initiatives.  Denis Brosnan, the Kerry Group/PLC's long-
time Managing Director, argues that to make sound strategic decisions the firm must 
know which sector it is in or wants to be in, the strengths and weaknesses of competitors, 
the nature of the market place, how consumer demands are changing and, for an 
international business, which decisions can be made locally and which must be reserved 
for the corporate office.  With the exception of the last point, these items are orthodox.   
However, the last point is undoubtedly important for a firm that has become 
geographically diverse.    
Brosnan contends that the food ingredients sector is somewhere between food 
engineering and pharmaceutical application.  The relatively "high tech" nature of the 
business, he said, has made it necessary for the Kerry Group to make expenditures on 
R&D equal to 2.0% to 3.0% of sales in order to remain competitive [42,43].  These 
percentages are a point or two higher than many dairy manufacturers spend on R&D. 
The Kerry organization's marketing practices evolved as it morphed from a dairy 
cooperative into a food ingredients and consumer foods company.  One noteworthy 
change was to end the firm's exports through the Irish Dairy Board.  Hugh Friel, deputy 
managing director of the Kerry Group, explained the decision, saying that producing 
differentiated dairy products to specification for a foreign buyer is an iterative process 
requiring extensive consultations between seller and buyer.  He argues that an 
intermediary can't explain the applications and technical characteristics of a differentiated 
product as effectively as the manufacturer.  Thus, Friel claims that it is counterproductive 
to have a dairy board as an intermediary between the foreign buyer and the processing 
plant during this process.        
How Sustainable are the Successes of Kerry Group/PLC?  The firm appears to 
have a well articulated vision, internally consistent strategies, and strategies that fit well 
with the external environment.  However, it is unclear whether the firm's value creation 
process--achieved in part by acquisitions of high profit market margin food ingredient 
companies--will be sustainable over the longer run.  
Questions about the sustainability of profits generated by acquisitions are raised 
by the following points offered by Collis and Montgomery [8, p. 91]: 
 
"When making an acquisition, managers often lose sight of the fact that  
acquisitions are purchased in a market--the market for corporate control--that  
functions reasonably well.  Importantly, the going price for a firm reflects not    19 
only the value of the firm as a stand alone concern, but also incorporates the  
incremental value the market feels the assets would have to a host of potential  
acquirers. Unless the winning bidder can use the assets in an unusual way, and  
create value that other bidders could not, it should not expect to earn economic  
rents on assets it purchases in the market…value created in most mergers is  
captured by the shareholders of the acquired firm." 
 
Brosnan apparently does not put much stock in such warnings, reporting that "As 
we go forward, what we say is that if Kerry is to get 15% earnings growth, from our 
knowledge we can expect to get about 10% of that organically, and Kerry will continue to 
achieve at least a further 5 to 6% growth through acquisitions" [43].   
Kerry Group/PLC's value creation process appears consistent with ideas advanced 
by Drucker, Prahalad, Hamel and other business strategists who claim that the essence of 
strategy lies in creating tomorrow's competitive advantages faster than competitors can 
mimic the ones you possess today.  The Kerry Group creates competitive advantage 
partly be being an early mover in acquiring high profit food ingredient businesses.  The 
firm may continue to find attractive food ingredient businesses to acquire for a few more 
years, but it is difficult to imagine that these acquisitions can continue indefinitely.  This 
means that at some point, the Kerry Group will need to squeeze more profits out of 
existing businesses or begin to acquire a different group of high profit businesses.  Value 
creation through such other avenues may be more difficult to achieve.   
Kerry's experience provides lessons for firms contemplating expansion into 
international dairy food markets and to organizations such as the NZDB which are 
considering fundamental changes in global marketing practices.  However, it is evident 
that unique conditions in the business environment in the 1970s in Ireland, a complex 
bundle of mutually reinforcing strategies, and early mover advantages (which will make 
it expensive for others to gain large positions in international food ingredient markets in 
particular) have contributed to the Kerry Group PLC's successes.  Opportunities to 
assemble this combination of developments and strategies will not occur frequently.   
Food Master International 
 
  Food Master International (Food Master) is owned by Developed Technology 
Resources, Inc. and Agribusiness Partners, both U.S. firms [18].  Food Master currently 
owns a controlling interest in eight dairies, five in Kazakhstan, two in Moldova, and one 
in Ukraine. Food Master's operations in Kazakhstan--the main focus of this section--
began in Almaty, Kazakhstan in 1995 as a joint venture between Developed Technology 
Resources, Inc. of the U.S. and the Kazak firm Ak-Bulak, Ltd.  The business began with 
the production of yogurt and expanded into fluid milk, fluid cream, kefir, sour cream, ice 
cream, cheeses, and fruit juices. Challenges associated with operating in  
Kazakhstan and how Food Master achieved at least limited success in a difficult business 
environment are illustrated by the firm's experience.    
  An Abbreviated Description of Food Master's Operations.  Food Master has  
dairy plants located in Kazakhstan in Almaty (Kazakhstan's largest city), Yessyk, Astana 
(Kazakhstan's capital), Chimkent, and Kurdai. The firm has a 50% to 55% market share 
of fluid milk sales in the Almaty region.  Company sales in Kazakhstan totaled about 
U.S.$ 14 million in 1998 and were expected to be substantially higher in 1999.  However,   20 
Food Master's sales in Kazakhstan fell short of projected levels in 1999 because of 
depressed consumer demand.  Partly as a result of sales shortfalls, Food Master's losses 
for Kazakhstan, Moldova, and the Ukraine reached U.S.$6.2 million in 1999.  A 
substantially portion of the losses occurred in Kazakhstan.  
  Mr. John Hupp, President of Developed Technology Resources, Inc., explained 
the losses as follows [21]: 
   
  "The economic crisis that hit Russia in August 1998 significantly affected our  
businesses in Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine in late 1998 and early 1999.   
The crisis saw the Kazakhstan tenge fall from 82 tenge to the dollar in December  
1998 to 139 to the dollar by the end of 1999, with similar devaluations in  
Moldova and Ukraine.  The crisis occurred at the same time Food Master was  
investing in new dairy assets, including our state-of-the-art aseptic juice and milk  
packaging factory in Kazakhstan. Unfortunately the currency devaluation was not  
matched by internal inflation within these countries, making it impossible to raise  
prices sufficiently to maintain margins (emphasis supplied).  Demand dropped  
with price increases, creating over capacity and difficulty in covering overhead  
expenses, many of which were dollar denominated expenses". 
 
Processing, Distribution and Procurement Practices.  Food Master employs 
orthodox industrial processes for producing and distributing dairy products, many of 
which are similar to those employed in Europe and North America.  Much of its 
competition is with firms that use equipment and techniques employed in Soviet times 
and by farmer distributors.  In the Almaty area, the firm's products are distributed mainly 
through large and medium-size supermarkets and other retail stores. Food Master 
distributes dairy products through about 200 of the 500 stores in the Astana area. 
In 1998, Food Master invested about U.S.$ 1.0 million to create milk collection 
stations for obtaining milk from small producers [18].  Twenty-eight stations were 
established around Almaty.  Each station has a cooling tank that holds one ton of milk, a 
complement of laboratory equipment, and a power generator. These stations are now a 
major source of milk for the firm's Almaty and Yessyk plants.   
  Challenges and Strategies.  The challenges facing Food Master in Kazakhstan 
include (a) keeping an adequate supply of milk, (b) dealing with milk quality and 
seasonality  problems, (c)  macro-economic problems of the type described above, e.g., 
currency devaluation and demand shortfalls, (d) finding suitable personnel, and (e) 
operating in a business environment where corruption is widespread.  
  It has been difficult for the firm to keep an adequate milk supply because of the 
widespread slaughter of the cattle herd in Kazakhstan during the 1990s.  Cattle numbers 
in Post-Communist Kazakhstan have declined sharply--56% from 1991 to 1999 [22].  
While dairy cattle numbers held up better than beef cattle numbers in this period, the 
reduction in dairy cattle was substantial.  Food Master set up the milk collection facilities 
to help small farmers stay in business and produce milk of acceptable quality.  The 
collection facilities and guarantees of prompt payment to farmers in cash have helped 
Food Master maintain a milk supply.  However, the collection facilities have not been as 
successful as anticipated.  Part of the problem is that some small producers mix off- 
flavor milk--e.g., milk from cows that have grazed on wild onion--in with other milk in   21 
the collection tank, spoiling or reducing the value of the entire tank.  The protein content 
of much of the milk obtained through the collection facilities also has been low. 
  Problems with milk quality produce a short shelf life for the firm's dairy products. 
Fresh fluid milk typically has only a two to three day shelf life.  This exacerbates 
problems with returns of unsold milk and adds to the firm's costs.  
  Food Master has integrated backward into milk production (operates its own dairy 
farm) on an experimental basis to see if integration would provide a steady supply of high 
quality milk in a cost-effective fashion.  Many food processors in North America have 
not found similar integration arrangements to be profitable.  It remains to be seen how 
effectively own farm production will work for Food Master in Kazakhstan. 
  Periods of high seasonal demand for milk do not match periods of high 
seasonable production in Kazakhstan, creating problems for Food Master and other milk 
processors.  Milk production is high and demand for dairy products weak in the summer.  
Demand is higher in other seasons and milk production low, especially in winter.  In the 
Astana area, farmer distributors represent strong competition for Food Master in the 
summer.  In the winter as milk supplies decline, many of these farmer distributors cease 
operations.  In winter, milk production drops sufficiently that Food Master has found it 
necessary to supplement farm-produced milk supplies by making reconstituted milk from 
butter and milk powder to serve fluid customers.   
  Erlan Sagadiev, a U.S.-educated Kazak who serves as Managing Director for 
Food Master in Kazakstan, said that important challenges facing the firm include finding 
personnel who can be trained to be good managers and skilled marketers. Both Sagadiev 
and Hupp argued--apparently not in jest--that a good operating rule in Kazakhstan was to 
"not hire anyone over 30."  This rule recognizes the difficulty of getting suitable 
performance from personnel who obtained their early business experience in firms that 
operated in the former Soviet Union.  
  As in much of the former Soviet Union, foreign businesses experience problems 
with corruption in Kazakhstan.  While the Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index is admittedly an imperfect measure of corruption, it does provide a 
rough measure of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and 
the general public. The 1999 Corruption Perceptions Index for Kazakhstan was 2.3 where 
a score 10 indicates highly clean and 0 equals highly corrupt [37].   
Corruption can manifest itself in a number of ways to businesses in Kazakhstan.   
Erlan Sagadiev said that an important challenge facing Food Master is "gray imports" of 
competing dairy products (especially ice cream) that enter the country without being 
subject to tariffs. The gray imports may be a product of generally ineffective border 
protection.  Ineffective border protection could result from a number of factors including 
border officials who are so poorly paid that they ignore their jobs or officials who receive 
payments to permit gray imports to enter without tariffs. John Hupp mentioned that after 
a foreign firm achieved profitability, it may find that the payments to local officials 
would begin--often exceeding 4% to 5% of revenues [20].  These payments might be 
required to register the company even if the firm had been previously registered.      
Interestingly, Food Master has encountered relatively few problems with 
corruption because the firm is managed by a well-connected Kazak.  Erlan Sagadiev's 
father was President of Kazakhstan's Academy of Sciences [20].  Erlan himself became a 
member of the President's advisory board after the firm became successful. These sorts of   22 
connections will allow a firm to be left alone by local officials who would normally 
solicit bribes. 
 
A Summary of Policy and Management Lessons 
 
  A few of the important dairy trade policy and management lessons that emerged 
during the past decade for dairy exporters and businesses investing in foreign dairy-food 
businesses are summarized below. 
 
Dairy Trade Policy Lessons 
 
•  Possibilities for substantial additional opening of world dairy markets appear limited 
in the near term.  U.S. policymakers have few strong incentives to push for more open 
U.S. dairy markets.  EU policymakers must decide what to do about domestic dairy 
policies--especially how to include Eastern European countries under the CAP--
before they will be positioned to consider substantial further liberalization of Union 
dairy trade policies.   
•  Australia's dairy industry experienced unique circumstances that created strong 
pressures for deregulation and a push for dairy export expansion.  The U.S., EU, and 
Canada face no similar pressures for deregulation.  If dairy policymakers in other 
countries wish to achieve deregulation, they will find that Australia's producer 
compensation measures represent a noteworthy model.  
•  The WTO panels' decisions regarding Class 5 pricing system have had chilling effects 
on proposals such as the U.S.'s Class IV dairy export program and two-tier dairy 
export programs advocated by the Danes.  But the possibility that Canada will resist 
changing the Class 5 system in ways that are acceptable to the U.S. and New Zealand 
underscores how glacially slow trade policies change following WTO panel 
decisions.  The dispute over Canada's Class 5 pricing system reminds one of the 
marathon U.S-EU trade dispute on bananas. 
•  The New Zealand Dairy Board's decision to adopt strategies that will increase the 
Board's direct investments in foreign dairy companies and use milk produced in other 
countries to expand the firm's sales (and presumably increase returns to New 
Zealand's dairy farmers) reflects in part a lack of optimism on the part of New 
Zealanders about further opening of world dairy markets.  This action speaks volumes 
about chances for further dairy trade liberalization in the near future. 
•  The diminished role of STE's in world dairy businesses is old news.  However, the 
changes being forced upon arguably the most important of the STEs--the New 
Zealand Dairy Board--provide noteworthy lessons. These changes promise to force 





•  Officers of many dairy-food companies point to Nestle as a model to be emulated in 
the sale of highly differentiated dairy-food products.  In particular, Nestle's practices 
show how a firm can capitalize on size advantages and operate successfully in both   23 
developed and developing economies.  B2B initiatives entered into by Nestle and 
other big food companies promise to squeeze profits of suppliers of these firms. 
•  The NZDB and Kerry Group/PLC provide examples of what can be accomplished 
mainly by superior management.   
--The NZDB has been able to cling to monopoly exporting and other long-established  
exporting practices in part because it has had superior management. How this biggest  
of the private dairy exporters and other New Zealand dairy organizations will adjust 
to strong pressures for change is unclear. For example, it is unclear how the Board 
and the Global Dairy Company that it may be joined with will acquire the capital 
needed to establish a world-class consumer foods business.    
--Cooperatives in more than a few countries point to Irish cooperative/public limited  
companies--especially the Kerry Group/PLC--as examples of what can be  
accomplished by converting to a cooperative/public limited company.  An important  
lesson from the Kerry Group's experience is to not attribute too much of the firm's  
success to Kerry's decision to convert to a cooperative/public limited company.   
While Kerry used equity capital raised in the London and Dublin stock exchanges to  
make some of its highly successful acquisitions, most of the firm's major  
acquisitions were made with debt. The success of the acquisitions probably is more a  
tribute to good management than anything else.  
•  Food Master's experience in Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Moldova underscores the 
difficulties of operating dairy-food businesses (and probably many other businesses)  
in the former Soviet Union.  The Company's  businesses appear to be operating in 
what Michael Porter and Warren Buffett describe as unattractive industries.  While 
Food Master is well managed,  the company's experience in Kazakhstan brings to 
mind the following comment by Warren Buffett [6]: 
 
"When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a  
reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business 
that remains intact". 
     While it may not display political correctness, Food Master demonstrated  
      that it has good reason for saying that in the former Soviet Union it is imperative to  
      "not hire anyone over 30". The over 30 set learned many business practices in the  
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